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Life as Screen ? Or how to grasp the virtuality of the body
In  h e r  b o o k  Life on the Screen, Sherry Turkle assumes th a t the new com puter 
technologies m aterialize »postm odern  theory and  b ring  it down to earth« 
(T urkle 1995, 18) A nd she continues: »Thus, m ore than  twenty years after 
m eetin g  the ideas o f  Lacan, Foucault, Deleuze and  G uattari, I am  m eeting 
them  again in my new life on  the screen. But this time, the Gallic abstractions 
are m ore  concrete . In  my com puter-m ediated  worlds, the self is m ultiple, 
fluid, an d  co n stitu ted  in in teraction  with m achine connections; it is m ade 
an d  transfo rm ed  by language; sexual congress is an exchange o f signifiers; 
a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  follows from  navigation  an d  tin k e rin g  ra th e r  than  
analysis.« (T urkle 1995, 15)
T urk le  is n o t the  only »cyber-theorist« defining the new technologies 
as a k ind  o f m aterialization o r visualization o f som ething previously invisible. 
Kathryn Hayles and  Slavoj Žižek, to nam e bu t two, develop a similiar position 
from  w ithin a L acanian  fram ework. But in doing so, they erase im portan t 
d iffe ren ces . T h e  d iffe ren c e , fo r instance , betw een  a topological an d  a 
descripive n o tion  o f  the unconscious, the difference betw een the O ther and 
the  o th e r, the  d ifference betw een the body and  its unconscious image.
V arious exam ples o f psychoanalytic cybertheories and  (art) practice 
(m edia art, net-projects) dem onstrate this impulse to erase these differences. 
B u t w h en  an  e q u a tio n  is m ad e  b etw een  an  (artis tic) n e tp ra c tic e  an d  
psychoanaly tical theo ry , a crucial d iffe rence is lost, nam ely  th a t w hich 
constitu te  the space o f the  subject.
New T ech n o lo g y  (N T ), it is claim ed, reconstitu tes the subject in a 
fu n d am en ta l way, n o t only effecting his m ental state b u t also and  forem ost 
his body. T h e  new m odes o f percep tion  in troduced  th rough  NT claim to 
b rin g  to an  en d  the  m o d ern  way o f vision and  the corresponding  subject of 
cen tra l perspectivity. B ut the discourse on NT does n o t clearly define the 
su b jec t n o r  is th e  n o tio n  o f vision p laced  u n d e r rigorous scrutiny. W ith 
L acan 's  question  »W hat is a picture« bo th  vision and the seeing subject are 
d e f in e d  in  a ra d ic a lly  d if f e re n t  way. In  my p a p e r  I will w ork  w ith  a 
psychoanalytical defin ition  o f the subject in o rd e r to theorize the otherness 
o r the  novelty o f  the subject o f  NT.
D iscourse ab o u t endings is a t this m om ent very m uch to the point. The
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spectre o f the end o f m edia, esp. mass m edia has b een  raised. T he e n d  o f 
art has also been  prophesized; n o t to m en tion  the im plosion  o f  the pub lic  
realm  and  the underm in ing  o f its ap p a ren t opposition  the  private. T h e  en d  
o f the subject has been  invoked again, on  this occasion includ ing  the e n d  o f 
gender. In  addition  a lam ent for the passing o f  the  h u m an  b e in g  has b een  
intoned.
Such talk o f endings leads naturally  to a consideration  o f beginnings. 
It presupposes a beginning which is e ither ontogenetically o r phylogenetically 
defined, o r  an  inaugauration  o f a co n ju n c tu re  betw een  specific h istorical 
epochs and  psychical stages.
I have suggested  the title  »Life as S creen?« in  o rd e r  to  evoke th e  
question o f those endings and  their co rrespond ing  beginnings, as well as to 
pose the question o f what and who com es to an  end . L acan’s question »W hat 
is a p icture« , which he posed  in his Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psycho- 
Analysis, was from the beginning essentially im plicated with the question what 
is a subject. My question here  will be w hich subject Lacan has in view an d  
how it relates to the discourse o f NT.
I shall begin with a short extract from  M arge Piercy’s novel Body o f Glass 
(1992). In  the following scene Shira, a p ro g ram m e r, en c o u n te rs  Jo d , a 
cyborg:
»She w ondered  exactly w hat one  d id  with a cyborg. She h ad  w aded  
th rough  gigabytes o f m aterial on  his hardw are, b u t she was still confused. 
Could one  kiss a cyborg? W ould n o t his m o u th  be  dry as an  can opener?  It 
was not. His lips were soft on  hers. His tongue was a little sm o o th er th an  a 
h um an  tongue b u t moist. Everything was sm oo ther, m ore  regu la r, m ore  
nearly perfect. T he skin o f his back was n o t like the  skin o f  o th e r  m en  she 
had been with, for always there were abrasions, pim ples, scars, irregularities. 
His skin was sleek as a w om an’s b u t d rie r to the  touch , w ithou t the pillow o f 
subcutaneous fat.« (Piercy 1992, 227)
After initially hesitating to begin a sexual re lation  with Jo d , Shira com es 
to be overw helm ed with his perfection to the  p o in t th a t she cou ld  no  longe 
ignore h e r own h um an  defects. Jo d  continually  pursues h e r  with questions 
a b o u t w hat it is like to be a h u m a n  w om an. S h ira  b ec am e  ev e r m o re  
uncertain  abou t the advantage o f being  h u m an  an d  the  essential d ifference 
betw een h um an  and  non  hum an.
A question raises itself here: w ether in the  co n tex t o f  the  e n c o u n te r  
between the technological, the m achinic an d  the non-hum an the precarious 
nature o f the centered hum an subject, to which Descartes drew  ou r atten tion , 
has becom e m anifest.
L acan 's m editations are germ ane to this issue. H e a rg u ed  historically
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th a t the Ego (an d  I m ean  here  the ego and no t the subject) is n o t only a 
precarious psychic s tru c tu re  b u t also a fragile socio-historical accom plish­
m ent. T h e  tragedy o f this subject, to p u t in its fully pathetic  dim ension, is 
th a t  in  o rd e r  to avoid losing  itself in  its en v iro n m en t, it m ust erase all 
d ifference betw een itself an d  its surroundings. (Cf. B rennan  1993, 4 ff.)
T h e  ten o r o f the theorists of the new technologies is that this subject 
has com e to  a total end . In  the epoch  o f the hum an interface there  is no 
m ore place for C artesian dualisms: Instead n a tu re /cu ltu re , b o d y /m in d  as 
well as m a le /fem a le  are  transform ed in to  technical questions in the sense 
th a t they are only tem porarily  fixed through  a coupling o f the hum an  with 
the  m achine. (Cf. Poster 1995)'
D onna Haraw ay’s cyborg illustrates this new hybrid form  o f being, half 
e lec tron ic , h a lf biological, b u t also historically constitu ted . A ccording to 
Haraway the cyborg arises at historical m om ents o f social transition; times 
o f  ra d ic a l u n c e r ta in ty  w h en  b o rd e rs  a re  b ro k en  o r  u n d e r  th rea t, an d  
trad itonal strategies o f draw ing boundaries no  longer function: m om ents 
such  as th e  p re s e n t w h en  th e  d istinc tion  betw een m an  an d  cybernetic 
organism s are b reak ing  down. (cf. Haraway 1990) In this con tex t Haraway 
draws p articu lar a tten tio n  to the porosity o f bodily boundaries, in particular 
the  skin. A ccording to F reud  the skin is a key elem ent in the construction of 
the Ego as such. It follows that the bodily interface is not only a question of the 
N T bu t also, from  a psychoanalytic perspective, the quesion o f the subject itself.
T hus, w hen Lacan refers to a historical form ation o f the Ego he m eans 
this in a thorough ly  m aterial-bodily sense. This historically unfolding Ego -  
a social-psychotic figuration  — m ust physically dem arcate the boundaries o f 
its body.
In  the n ex t section I move from  considering the historical Ego to an 
ex p lo ra tio n  o f the psychic subject, a subject which accord ing  to L acan’s 
theo ry  o f the  m irro r stage, is always an d  already at war n o t only with its 
env ironm en t, b u t also an d  especially with itself, and with its im age which is 
always o th e red , an d  to w hich it can never be reconciled.
The excess of the image
Lacan re la tes th e  em b attled  status o f the subject to narcissism. T he 
subject n e ith e r loves its im age nor is beloved by it, bu t ra th e r loves that which
1 This is, of course, only one dominant strand in discourses on the NT. The other strand 




exceeds the image. T he subject loves the p ic tu re 's  excess, a p ic tu re  b eh in d  
the picture. This »behind-the-picture« is the ideal-ego, th a t psychic function  
in which the child exists as its own ideal or, to p u t it m o re  correctly , will 
have becom e its own ideal retrospectively. As Lacan m akes the p o in t, the 
ideal-ego is that p o in t »at which he [th e  subject] desires to gratify h im self 
in himself«. (Lacan 1981, 257) O r as h e  defines it elsew here: »T hat w here 
the subject sees himself, namely, w here th a t real, inverted  im age o f his own 
body that is given in the schem a o f the ego is forged, it is n o t from  th ere  th a t 
he  looks a t himself.« (Lacan 144)
H ere a distinction appears betw een the  eye an d  the  gaze w hich will be 
im p o rtan t to us in what follows.
The basis o f this distinction is F reu d ’s d ifferen tiation  betw een the drive 
and the instinct. T hrough this radical d ifferentiation, w hich F reud an d  Lacan 
were never tired  o f invoking, the no tion  o f  prim al lack is in tro d u ced . This 
lack is the p ro p e r place o f the subject. For the rest o f  his life the  sub ject will 
h au n t and  be haun ted  by this lack, w hich takes form  in his im age, befo re  
his image, b eh in d  his image.
The drama o f being part of the picture
Lacan has associated this overdeterm ined split (Spaltung) between drive 
and  instinct, ideal-ego an d  egoideal, eye an d  gaze w ith th e  constitu tive  
function o f prim al aggression. He explains this aggression in term s o f  an  
unusual concep t o f mimesis as an intransitive resem blance in w hich th e re  is 
no  resem bled  object.
Lacan adapts this concep t from  R oger Callois’s w ork on  the  m im etic 
capacity o f insects. A ccording to Callois the  tendency  o f insects to take on 
the co lour o f their background is n o t to be  u n d ers to o d  as self-protection or 
flight from  an aggressor bu t ra ther as an  a ttem p t to becom e p art o f  a picture. 
As M ichael Taussig puts it in »Mimesis an d  Alterity« it is a m atte r o f  being  
seduced by space, a spacing out o f  the self, a d ram a »in w hich the self is b u t 
a self-diminishing po in t am id others, losing its boundedness.«  (Taussig 1995, 
34)
W hereas animals h u n t each o th e r th ro u g h  the  sense o f smell, m im icry 
arises in the field o f seeing. It signals a fa ilu re to m ain ta in  the b o u n d ary  
between in n e r and  outer, between the body and  its env ironm en t, o r as Jo an  
C op jec  d e fin e s  it, b e tw een  »an u n c o n s c io u s  b e in g  a n d  a c o n sc io u s  
semblance«. T he effect of mimicry o r the effect o f rep resen ta tion , as Copjec 
argues, does n o t place the subject in »happy accord  with the reality« b u t
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ra th e r  in d u ces the  »suspicion th a t som e reality is b e in g  cam ouflaged«. 
(Copjec 1995, 37) In  response to such representation -  mimicry, the subject’s 
ow n b e in g  b re a k s  u p  b e tw e en  the  u n co n sc io u s  b e in g  an d  consc ious 
sem blance. As Lacan m akes the  point: »To im itate is no  d o u b t to rep roduce 
an  im age. B ut a t bo ttom , it is, for the subject, to be inserted  in a function 
whose exercise grasps it.« (Lacan 100)
Picture and gaze do not meet
How do these considerations bear on the question o f N T ’s, m ourn ing  
for the  subject an d  the hym n to a new »fluid and  polym orphic structu re  o f 
identity«?
At the en d  o f the Four Fundamental Concepts Lacan surprisingly m entions 
w hat he  says we can call the »mass media«. H e indicates th a t it is tem pting  
to see these m ed ia  as augm en tin g  the society o f the spectacle, to use Guy 
D eb o rd 's  term . Instead, he claims, they contribu te to a diffusion o f the gaze 
an d  the voice, b u t he  m akes n o  fu rther com m ent on this m atter.
I shall a ttem p t to re la te  this diffusion of the gaze to the  novelty o f the 
N T specifically in o rd e r  to follow up  the question o f the »location o f the 
subject«.
In his book  Techniques o f the Observer (1995) Jo n a th an  Crary argues that 
N T are new  insofar as they o p era te  w ithout a p o in t of view, that is w ithout a 
place which the  viewer can occupy. Thus the cam era obscura m odel with its 
centrally focussed perspective is underm ined. And this, Crary observes, m ight 
poten tially  have fatal consequences for the subject and  m ight fo reg round  
in co n c re te  fashion the spectacle of its fragility.
As I already no ted , Lacan defines the Ego as historically and psychically 
always already precarious. H e has em phasized this precarious status through 
his d istinc tion  betw een the Subject and  the Ego, echo ing  the split between 
eye an d  the gaze, a gaze w hich poposes an  impossible location which canno t 
be occup ied  by the  subject.
By th in k in g  to g e th e r these two im possibe locations, the co m p u te r­
generated  one m en tioned  by jonathan  Crary, and the psychic one considered 
by Lacan, I p ro p o se  to b rin g  to g eth er the radical ex teriority  o f bo th  the 
techn ical and  psychic stru c tu ra tio n  o f the subject.
In o rd e r to u n d ertak e  this thinking together I will criticize two strands 
o f th o u g h t in m edia  theory: on  the one hand, Screen an d  A pparatus theory, 
w hich b o th  focus u p o n  the  im age, the screen, and  their equation  with the 
m irro r. A nd o n  the  o th e r a sim ilar equation  o f the m irro r with the m on ito r
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within the discourse on  NT. In the latter discourse the m on ito r is u n derstood  
as a m irro r and  virtual reality is conceived  as th e  space o f  th e  L acan ian  
im aginary.
At the center o f film theory lies the m odel o f the Lacanian m irro r stage 
as an original m isrecognition o f the subject in the im age o f »an-other«. Both 
A p p ara tu s  th eo ry  (B audry, C om olli, M etz) a n d  B ritish  S c reen  th eo ry  
(Mulvey, H eath , W ollen) take over L acan 's  theo ry  o f the  m irro r stage in 
o rd e r to identify the screen as a m irro r befo re  w hich o r b e tte r  in  w hich the 
subject misrecognizes itself. In this taking over, the L acanian m irro r stage is 
subjected to an overgeneralization which is fatally repeated  in the field o f NT.
I w an t to  d e m o n s tra te  this b rie fly  by d iscu ssin g  Kaja S ilv e rm an 's  
defin ition  o f the gaze as a cultural gaze.
According to Lacan, in the re la tion  betw een the m irro r im age an d  the 
child a th ird  elem ent intervenes, the  gaze o f the  m o ther. In the  sam e way, 
accord ing  to Baudry, in the re la tio n  betw een  th e  screen  im age a n d  the  
spectator a th ird  elem ent is involved, w hich Baudry like Lacan identifies as 
a gaze. This th ird  e lem en t makes possible an d  guaran tees the identification  
between the child and  the m irror im age as well as tha t between the spectator 
and  the screen image. In the case o f  the  cinem a, Baudry argues, this th ird  
elem ent is the gaze associated with the  cam era.
I now w ant to re tu rn  to the question  o f the split betw een the eye an d  
the gaze ab o u t which Lacan says: »I see only from  o n e  p o in t, b u t in  my 
existence I am  looked at from  all sides.« (Lacan 72) We are, h e  con tinues, 
»beings who are looked at, in the spectacle o f  the  world. (...) Is th e re  no  
satisfaction in being u n d er that gaze (...) tha t circum scribes us, an d  which 
in the first instance makes us beings who are looked  at, b u t w ithou t showing 
this?« (Lacan 75)
In a conscious waking state this function  o f the  gaze is usually elided , 
b u t shows itself only in special m om ents (Lacan m entions the  im ages o f the 
dream , paintings etc.). In  o th er w ords, the  gaze is th a t w hich is invisible. 
This is also the m o m en t th ro u g h  w hich  th e  ab sen ce  o f  th e  sign ified  is 
m anifested. T he gaze does n o t acknow ledge the subject, it does n o t look, 
b u t ra th e r causes a disturbance, a topp ling  o f the subject. This gaze unfolds 
itself in the place o f the O th er and enables the  ch ild ’s first iden tification  at 
the cost o f an  originary alienation: »The gaze is som eth ing  from  w hich the 
subject has separated  itself off, b u t w hich was once  p a rt o f  th e  subject; it  is 
thus an object petit a.« (Cowie 1997, 288)
Silverman takes up this difference between the eye2 and  gaze in asserting 
that the gaze does n o t look, that in this sense it is m isleading even to re fer to
2 In Silverman’s considerations the eye is the look, the bodily context of the eye, the
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it as a gaze. N evertheless in  h e r  subsequen t argum ents she indicates, in 
explicit re feren ce  to Lacan, th a t the gaze is in a m etaphoric  relation to the 
ca m e ra . T h e  on ly  fu n c tio n  o f  this c in em atic  a p p a ra tu s , a cco rd in g  to 
Siverman, is to pu t the subject in the picture. How this »being in the picture«, 
this »being p h o to g rap h ed « , how this operates is no t a function  o f the gaze, 
b u t ra th e r the co n cern  o f  the  »cultural screen«. W hile the gaze represents 
th e  p re sen ce  o f  th e  o th e rs  as such, it is the  func tion  o f the eye-look to 
d e te rm in e  th e  d irec tio n  o f  m ean ing  p roduc tion , th a t is to decide which 
aspects are  m obilized in / th ro u g h  being pho tographed . Thus the eye-look 
becom es the place in  w hich the  im aginary subject encounters the almighty 
gaze. In  this co n tex t th e re  is a ded ifferen tia tion  of the gaze and  the  eye 
th ro u g h  the m ed iation  o f the »cultural screen«. T he gaze as cultural gaze 
becom es the site o f  socio-cultural power which leads individuals in to  their 
respective m odes o f being.
T h e  defin ition  o f the  gaze as an anonym ous societal look in the sense 
o f  the  Foucau ld ian  p an o p tico n  resurfaces in m odified form  in the analysis 
o f the  NT.
In  this co n tex t the  co m p u ter m onito r is assimilated to the m irro r and  
the  elec tron ic  space is taken as a m aterialization o f the unconscious. In  this 
respect, then , it is the ideal ego which greets us in cyberspace.
T o consider these claims, I shall briefly consider two exam ples, taken 
from  K athryn Hayles an d  Slavoj Žižek.
V irtual reality, Žižek writes, renders explicit that m echanism  which until 
now  has b een  h id d en  b u t was always and already foundational to the subject. 
A nd Kathryn Hayles claims in connection with cyberspace that it materializes 
the  L acanian  m irro r stage. L acan 's im aginary is thus given a th reed im en­
sional physical reality. T h a t is, the im aginary is m ade real in the sense o f a 
tech n o lo g ica l p ro d u c tio n . W hereas Hayles equates the  im aginary  with 
physicality, she in troduces the  symbolic through equating it with the virtual, 
i.e. the  e lec tro n ic  p ro d u ced  d ata  realm  o r da ta  space. T hus, she argues, 
»cyberspace rep resen ts  a pow erful challenge to the custom ary construction 
o f the body’s boundaries, open ing  them  to transform ing configurations that 
always bear the trace o f  the O ther. The resulting disorientation can function 
as a wedge to destabilize presuppositions abou t self and the O ther.«  (Hayles 
1993, 187)
As is well know n, Lacan makes a distinction betw een the (lower case) 
»other« an d  the  (capital) »O ther«, a distinction which Žižek equates with 
the d ifference betw een the ideal ego and  the ego-ideal as well as betw een




symbolic and  im aginary identification. W hereas the re la tio n  with the  o th e r  
is im aginary in  the sense tha t the self resem bles the o th e r, the  re la tio n  with 
the O ther is symbolic, that is, depends on  the structure o f language. Symbolic 
identification is identification with the O th er, the place from  w here we see 
ourselves as likeable. This place o f the  O th er, th e  symbolic o rd e r, carries 
within it a kernel, a Thing (das D ing), a void w hich the subject m ust conceal. 
T hat is, this gaze from  the place o f the  O th e r is n o t a gaze in a full sense. 
Rather, it is an em pty gaze, by w hich the  subject is h a u n te d  an d  feels itself 
observed, b u t nevertheless for whom the  subject wants to »play a role«, as 
Žižek poin ts out. Both identifications — the im aginary  an d  the  sym bolic — 
are n o t strictly separab le  because im ag inary  id en tif ic a tio n  is always an  
»identification on behalf of a certain gaze in the Other«. (Žižek 1994, 106)
In  H ay le’s considera tions o f th e  »M irro r o f  th e  C yborg«, thus th e  
L acan ian  O th e r  slides very over in to  c o n c re te  o th e rs . C y b ersp ace  is 
u n d e r s to o d  as o ffe r in g  a w hole ra n g e  o f  p o ss ib ilitie s  to  in te ra c t ,  to  
com m unicate with »other people«. A ccording to Hayles, the se lf  s boundaries 
have to denigrate  their outside. T hus w om en are co n stru c ted  as castrated  
m en, blacks as in ferior whites, etc. T h e  m irro r (o f the  cyborg ), by con trast, 
conflates self and O ther, thus en tailing  new  en co u n te rs  w here the O th e r »is 
accepted as both  d ifferen t and enriching«. (Hayles 188) T h e  p u p p e t on the 
screen , th e  avatar, thus carries th e  » p o ten tia l to  b ec o m e  m o re  th an  a 
puppet, rep resen ting  instead a zone o f in te rac tio n  th a t opens the subject to 
the exhilirating realization o f O therness valued as such.« (188)
H ere  it becom es clear, th a t b o th  the  L acan ian  m irro r stage an d  his 
concep t o f the O th e r have lost their m eaning . T h e  O th er, as the  site from  
which the subject is spoken, has b een  red u ced  to m ulticu ltu ra l an d  social 
differences.
And even Žižek takes on a som ew hat mystical tone w hen discussing the 
in c re as in g  co m p u te riza tio n . H e like so m any  o th e rs  asks h im se lf  th e  
apocalyptic question w hether it is possible th a t the  en d  o f sexuality a n d  the  
end  o f the  hum an  subject are at h an d  th ro u g h  the  em erg en ce  o f  the  PC. 
(Cf. Žižek 1996, 284)
According to him , a confusion arises with the  advent o f the co m p u ter, 
one which reactivates a stage before orig inary  loss, befo re  the  split betw een 
ideal ego an d  ego-ideal.
T h e  e n d  o f sexuality as Žižek describes it, is in tro d u c e d  th ro u g h  a 
p artnersh ip  with a post o r non-hum an  being. H ere  the story betw een Shira 
a n d jo d , which I m entioned  in the beginning , is relevant. T h ro u g h  this n o n ­
h u m an  b ein g  in to  which the sub ject is so to  speak  locked , a p rim o rd ia l 
asexual stage of being is achieved, a stage befo re  any sexual m ark ing  an d
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there fo re  befo re  subjectivity. Žižek illustrates this in term s of the possibilities 
the n e t offers for g en d er switching and creating new bodies: »What fascinates 
people far m ore than  the unpreceden ted  access to inform ation, the new ways 
o f  learn ing , shopp ing , and  so on, is the possibility o f constitu ting  'v irtual 
co m m u n itie s , in w hich I am  free to assum e an arb itra ry  sexual, e thn ic , 
religious, etc., identity. A gay male, for exam ple, can en te r  a closed sexual 
com m unity  and , via the exchange o f messages, partic ipate in a fictionalized 
g ro u p  sexual activity as a heterosexual woman.« (Žižek 1996, 285)
Žižek concludes that these encounters represent the absolute fulfillment 
o f th e  C artesian  subject, because all features (of the sub ject’s identity) are 
con tingen t and  interchangeable. In his description of changing o n e ’s identity 
on the  net, Žižek equates sexual identity with ethnic and  religious identity. 
T hus h e  conflates the decisive difference between the »role o f gender«  and 
the »imperative o f sex«. A ccording to Charles Shepherdson, sexual difference 
in co n trast to g en d e r roles is n o t a »hum an convention, like dem ocracy o r 
m onarchy , a social form  th a t was invented at som e p o in t in historical time, 
a  c o n tin g e n t fo rm a tio n  th a t one  cu ltu re  p ro d u c ed , b u t  th a t  m ig h t be 
rep laced  by a n o th e r  form«. (Shepherdson  1994, 160) R ather it has to be 
seen  as the  effect o f  the  drive which Freud has strictly d istinguished from  
the  instinct. G en d er d ifference, by contrast, is tied to rep resen ta tion , to the 
symbolic o rd er, to the call o f the O th er and  his desire.
T o em phasize the im perative o f sexual difference m eans to insist upon  
the structu ra l inevitability o f  represen ta tion  for hum an sexuality. This does 
n o t im ply a re tu rn  to  a  bodily  n a tu re  or a natu ra l body b u t ra th e r  is an 
in d ic a t io n  th a t  s e x u a lity  (a c c o rd in g  to  b o th  F re u d  a n d  L acan ) is 
c o m p re h e n d e d  n e i th e r  as g e n d e r  n o r  sex, an d  th e  bo d y  n e ith e r  as a 
biological fact n o r a social construct, bu t rather as constitutively denaturalized 
»organ-ized by the im age and  the word«. (Shepherdson 1994, 170)
U p o n  en try  to the symbolic order, the subject is o rganized in term s o f 
a b in ary  o p p o s itio n , e i th e r  having  o r being  the  Phallus. T h e  O th e r  is 
im plicated  in this re la tion  in the sense that the subject wants e ith e r to have 
o r be fo r the O ther. T he question o f which position will b e /c a n  be taken up  
d ep en d s u p o n  the  desire o f the O ther. As such switching betw een g ender 
p o sitions is on ly  possib le  to a lim ited  ex ten t. T h at is, the  phan tasm atic  
exchange o f sexual positions is always accomplished from an already relatively 
fixed position . This applies equally to Žižek’s phantasies as to o th e r stories 
o f g en d e r exchange on  the n e t such as Sherry T urk le’s. As Elizabeth Cowie 
m akes the point: »The ap p a ren t mobility of sexual fantasy, w hether enacted  
o r im agine, can only arise with a — relative — fixing of the subject’s position 
o f sexual d ifference an d  its identifications.« (Cowie 1997, 248)
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The earlier m entioned connection between the field o f vision and  sexual 
difference »takes place« on the level o f  the  drive. D ue to the  sp lit betw een 
the eye an d  the gaze it is »in which the drive is m anifested  a t th e  level o f  the 
scopic field«. (Lacan 73) T he way in w hich Lacan defines m asculinity  and  
feminity coincides with this split to th e  ex ten t th a t the two sexes o r b e tte r  
th e ir ap p e a ra n ce  in the sym bolic o rd e r , involve a sim iliar s tru c tu re  o f 
deception , o f  m asquerade.
Lacan takes the reality o f the unconscious as a sexual reality, w hich has 
no  representation o f masculinity and  feminity. T h e ir d ifference appears only 
in the symbolic o rder as a m asquerade which has to conceal its fun d am en ta l 
loss. A loss which is n o t a sexually m arked  loss, b u t ra th e r  refers, as Lacan 
says, to »the relation  between the living subject an d  th a t w hich h e  loses by 
having to pass, for his reproduction , th ro u g h  the sexual cycle.« ( Lacan 199) 
The fact that masculinity and feminity have to m im ic this loss, to conceal 
it in a m asquerade, can now be identified with the dialectic re la tion  betw een 
the  eye an d  the gaze. T h a t is, b o th  re la tio n s  b e a r  u p o n  a fu n d a m e n ta l 
s tru c tu re  o f  d ec ep tio n . D esc rib in g  love L acan  h im se lf  has m a d e  this 
com parison.
»When in love, I solicit a look, what is profoundly unsatisfying and  always 
m issing is th a t -  You never look at me from the place from which I  see you.« (Lacan 
103) A nd with respect to the field o f vision he  continues:
»Conversely, what I  look at is never what I  wish to see. (...) A triumph o f the 
gaze over the eye.« (Lacan 103)
W hat I have said, suggests tha t m edia  apparatuses such as film an d  NT, 
each in th e ir d ifferen t way, conceal this m asquerade, in  the  sense th a t they 
m ake the subject believe h im /h e rse lf  to be  p a rt o f  the  p icture . O n e  now 
could speculate abou t N T ’s d ifferen t m odes o f  concealing  th an  film ’s.
In sum, in order to theorize the end  o f the m odern  subject, and  relatedly 
the end  o f art and  m edia, as well as to u n d e rs ta n d  the  novelty o f  NT, it is 
necessary to define the notion  o f the subject o n e  is talk ing about. M erely to 
state tha t N T underm ine Cartesian dualism s an d  its gender-m arked  subject 
trivializes th e  issue. I t is also m is le ad in g  to  e q u a te  th e  su b je c t o f  th e  
unconscious with the social o ther in the net, as Kathryn Hayles does echo ing  
the »cultural screen« as in troduced  by Kaja Silverm an. In Žižek’s ap p ro ach  
the O th e r is excluded in NT. But as H enry  Krips m ade the  p o in t -  isn ’t the 
O ther in the case of the net a prosthetic O th er (a cruel superego) from  which 
pleasure can  be derived. And isn ’t this fu n c tio n  taken  over by the  virtual 
com m unity  o f th e  users? In his m ore  re c e n t analysis -  in  th e  P lague o f  
Fantasies (1997) -  Žižek argues that w hat h ap p en s in VR is the  fo reclosure 
o f  th e  rea l. T his com es very close to  w h a t I am  a rg u in g : th a t  m e d ia
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apparatuses are  m eans o f concealing the void. T he question, then, is in what 
d iffe ren t ways N T b lurs the  line betw een the subject and  the user? M ore 
specifically, w hat drives th e  subject, so tha t his location, which is strictly 
speak ing  a non-location , can be  encom passed -  as im age, before the im age 
an d  b e h in d  the  im age. O r to p u t it in a slightly d iffe ren t way: ... in-between 
time after before but before after.
This phrase by Brian Massumi, then, marks the bridge between the body 
(as such) an d  the rep resen ta tiona l body and  m ight therefore  be taken as an 
im age to th ink  with, to th ink  o f the relation between the body and its various 
stages o f virtuality.
Thanks to Henry Krips for stimulating disscussions and the translation. 
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